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INFLATION TARGETS VERSUS INTERNATIONAL MONETARY INTEGRATION 






The debate about whether Canada should seek some form of monetary integration with the United States 
is surveyed. It is argued that the choice here is among overall monetary orders, rather than among 
exchange rate regimes considered in isolation, with particular attention needing to be paid to questions of 
the credibility of policy and the accountability of policy makers. Canada’s recent economic performance 
under its current monetary order - inflation targets, underpinned by a flexible exchange rate, and pursued 
by accountable policy makers - is assessed, and arguments that the flexible exchange rate has undermined 
the economy’s real performance are analysed. Alternative orders are considered. It is concluded that the 
most economically attractive among them - negotiated adoption by Canada of the US dollar with 
provision being made for meaningful Canadian input into policy decisions and the supervision and 
oversight of the monetary system - is not politically attainable, and that the economic and political 
drawbacks associated with intermediate arrangements are large enough to render them clearly inferior to 
Canada’s current monetary order. 
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To say that the world=s monetary system is in a state of constant evolution is platitudinous, but true. At the 
moment, international monetary arrangements seem to veering towards two extremes: national currencies 
supported by exchange rate flexibility, or extremely hard fixes, of which monetary integration across national 
boundaries is the limiting case. In the post-World War II period, Canada has been the most steadfast of floaters, 
having Atemporarily@ abandoned its Bretton Woods peg to the US dollar in 1950, and having returned to a fixed 
rate only once for a little under ten years (1962-70) in the interim. But even Canada is open to change, and for the 
last few years, particularly since the international financial upheavals of 1997-98, there has been an ongoing local 
debate about whether the country would be better off with some sort of fixed exchange rate on the United States 
dollar, and more specifically, as that debate has evolved, the adoption of a common North American a common 
currency has emerged as the alternative of choice to the status quo.1 
This paper provides an overview of the debate in question, and a defence of Canada=s current monetary 
arrangements. The following pages first establish a framework for discussion by arguing that, in dealing with the 
issues at stake here, one needs to consider a country=s overall monetary order, including its political aspects, rather 
than the exchange rate regime in isolation. Then Canada=s current inflation-targeting monetary order and the 
economy=s performance since its inception in 1991 are discussed.  A survey of the forms that North American 
monetary integration might feasibly take leads to the conclusion that the degree of US hegemony over Canadian 
affairs that is implicit in any monetary arrangement to which the US might be willing to be party presents a 
serious political deterrent to Canada=s pursuing such a goal, and that, given the satisfactory performance of the 
current monetary order, it should be kept in place. 
 
A Framework for Discussion: The Monetary Order 
All national economies use money and are open, and yet economists have often broken the discussion of their 
monetary arrangements into self-contained segments to be discussed in isolation from one another. Thus, when 
domestic matters have been the centre of attention, they have discussed such topics as rules versus authorities, real 
versus various nominal targets for monetary policy, and within the latter grouping they have debated the relative 
merits of  money growth, nominal GDP growth, and inflation. When the design of central banks has been on the 
agenda, they have analysed goal and instrument independence, not to mention interest rate and base control as 
alternative means of implementing monetary policy. And when specifically international matters have been in the 
forefront, they have talked, among other things, about fixed versus crawling versus flexible exchange rates, with 
and without policy co-ordination, and so on. 
Now to break a topic down into manageable portions has its uses, but it has its perils too, for it is easy to 
lose sight of the inter-connectedness of topics, and to fail to notice that conclusions reached about one area have 
                                                 
1Among early contributions to this debate are Courchene and Harris (1999a), Grubel (1999), Laidler 
(1999), Orr (1999) and von Furstenberg (2000). 
 
 1
implications for others. In the monetary policy field this has sometimes happened, and that is why the first 
substantive step in this paper must be to establish a framework for the discussion that recognises the 
interconnectedness of the components of what I like to call the monetary order.2   
It is helpful to think of such an order as consisting of four components:  
(i)  The goals of monetary policy;  
(ii)  The institutional background and broader policy framework within which these goals are pursued;  
(iii)  The credibility of those same goals among the public at large, and hence the compatibility of their 
beliefs and actions with those goals;  
(iv)  The political institutions through which decisions about the first two components of the monetary 
order are taken, and the extent to which they provide for public accountability on the part of those making 
and executing those decisions. 
With matters put this way, it is readily seen that it is all too easy for dissonances to arise within any 
country=s monetary order which can lead to malfunctions.  A monetary order may be incoherent for many reasons, 
and fail to achieve its goals. For example, problems can be created by assigning the twin goals of Afull 
employment@ and Aprice stability@ to a monetary authority, and then giving specific empirical content to them that 
renders them unattainable as a consequence of, say, policies that are simultaneously being implemented towards 
the structure of the labour market. Or, to cite another common failing, the credibility of a low inflation or fixed 
exchange rate goal can be undermined by irresponsible fiscal policies. A flawed monetary order will not maintain, 
or even perhaps achieve, credibility, and in due course, it will lose the political support needed to keep it in place.3 
Furthermore, it is not hard to see how a country=s political history and institutions can influence the extent 
to which the population at large trusts the monetary authorities to begin with, and expects to be able to hold them 
accountable on an ongoing basis through mechanisms that the current institutional framework, itself a creation of 
a specific history, provides. Such factors explain why, for example, the electorates of European countries that 
have ratified the Maastricht Treaty, one of whose elements was the establishment of a new currency, the Euro, 
under the auspices of a European Central Bank that is virtually independent of the domestic politics of individual 
countries, are in a very different position vis-a-vis their monetary authorities than the electorate of the United 
States. There the central bank draws its authority from the Federal Reserve Act, must abide by the Humphrey 
Hawkins Act, and defines itself as independent within rather than of the federal government. 
More generally, these factors also explain why the politics of monetary policy are likely to play 
                                                 
2I prefer this time honoured phrase to the more commonly used but narrower Amonetary policy regime@ 
since it more naturally encompasses the attitudes of the general public towards monetary policy, including their 
expectations about its outcome. 
3 Heymann and Leijonhufvud (1995) particularly stress this factor as underlying the breakdown of 
stabilisation programs in their study of High Inflation. 
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themselves out in very different ways in different jurisdictions. Again, a comparison of Europe and North 
America is instructive. As Lars Jonung (2002) has recently argued, for Sweden and the United Kingdom, the two 
members of the European Union that still maintain a flexible exchange rate against the Euro, the main political 
element in the decision whether or not to give up their own currencies has to do with differing degrees of trust that 
their electorates put in domestic versus European institutions, either of which would nevertheless be accountable 
to them. In North America on the other hand, as will be shown below, the major political choice facing the 
Canadian electorate is whether to continue with Canadian policy making institutions that are domestically 
accountable, or to surrender control of important aspects of economic policy to American institutions that would 
remain accountable only to the US electorate. 
There is, then, no single monetary order that is uniquely coherent, nor is there any particular reason to 
suppose that, among those that are economically viable in principle, the same style of monetary order will turn out 
to be politically acceptable, or even workable, in every country. To pose the fundamental choice in monetary 
matters as being among alternative orders, therefore, draws attention to certain pitfalls in more partial approaches, 
not least, and perhaps particularly, those which deal with to exchange rate arrangements in isolation. Even the 
traditional question Afixed or flexible exchange rates?@ turns out to be badly formulated when viewed in this light.  
A fixed exchange rate is, in and of itself, a goal for monetary policy, and because the exchange rate is 
clearly visible to economic agents in general, and a variable of considerable importance too, a fixed value for it 
may be a credible policy goal, and one for whose achievement the authorities can be held politically accountable. 
To argue for a fixed exchange rate, then, is to argue for an arrangement that in and of itself comes close to 
characterising a coherent monetary order because it impinges directly on three of its four defining components. A 
flexible exchange rate, on the other hand, is merely an institutional arrangement that falls under heading (ii) 
above. Its adoption does not define a policy goal, but merely permits some other goal, or goals, attainable or not, 
to be pursued. It is only when these have been specified that a discussion of the viability of a monetary order, one 
of whose components is a flexible exchange rate, can begin. It is small wonder, then, that when faced with a 
choice between Afixed@ or Aflexible@ exchange rates in isolation, most people select Afixed@. The alternative all too 
often seems synonymous with Aanything goes@, and who would choose that in monetary affairs? 
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To think in terms of the monetary order, rather than of the exchange rate regime itself, is useful in other 
ways too. For example, an adjustable peg regime, viewed in this light, appears as a monetary order under which a 
fixed value for the exchange rate is the single target of monetary policy, but only for so long as the monetary 
authorities do not find some other goal more pressing. The difficulties that such arrangements have had in practice 
in establishing credibility, and hence their proneness to speculative attacks, are not hard to understand when 
matters are put this way. And more sophisticated proposals for exchange rate arrangements also present problems 
which can be easily elucidated when they are placed in this broader context. ACrawling pegs@ or Atarget zones@ are, 
for example, typically proposed because they permit the monetary authorities simultaneously to attend to other 
matters. Until these other matters are specified, however, and their interconnectedness to the exchange rate 
analysed, it is impossible to say anything about the viability of the monetary order of which the exchange rate 
regime in question is to form a part. And if these interconnections are complicated, then even when a proposed 
monetary order of this sort is logically coherent, its complexity may well create difficulties when it comes to 
generating credibility and political support for it.4 The framework provided by the idea of a monetary order forces 
one to confront these difficulties. 
Now, in practice, flexible exchange rates have sometimes been associated with some very odd policy 
goals indeed, in Canada as much as elsewhere, and their pursuit has implied  monetary orders that have been 
incoherent, or if coherent, incapable of establishing credibility, and hence unsustainable. There is no need here to 
discuss these matters in detail. Suffice it to assert that a flexible exchange rate does not inevitably create such 
problems. In particular, Canada=s current monetary order is based on clearly stated inflation targets and is 
supported by fiscal policy that is compatible with their continued pursuit. Furthermore, the general public 
understands what the inflation rate is and why it is important, and this understanding in turn provides an important 
precondition for the credibility of monetary policy, and for the electorate=s ability to hold policy makers 
accountable for their performance. 
In short, the choice now being debated in Canada is not between maintaining a flexible exchange rate or 
going to some sort of hard-fix arrangement vis-a-vis the US dollar, though the matter is often stated this way.  
Rather, it lies among maintaining a rather recently established but coherent monetary order based on inflation 
targets for a separate national currency, whose exchange rate against other currencies is market determined, and a 
number of alternatives, all involving one degree or another of North American monetary integration. The first step 
in evaluating this choice must be to describe the current order in more detail, and then to assess the economy=s 
performance in its presence. 
 
Canada=s Current Monetary Order 
In Canada at the moment, the precise goal of monetary policy is the maintenance of an inflation rate as measured 
by the consumer price index that fluctuates around 2 per cent. per annum, while remaining in a 1 - 3 per cent 
range. This goal has been jointly set by the Minister of Finance on behalf of Parliament, and the Bank of Canada, 
so the latter institution clearly does not enjoy anything approaching what Stanley Fischer (1995) has called Agoal 
independence@. It is also worth noting that, though the inflation target clearly defines a mandate for the Bank of 
                                                 
4Indeed, I suspect that the rapidly growing preference for monetary orders involving simple goals, such as 
an inflation target or a rigidly fixed exchange rate, largely stems from these latter considerations. After all, as far 
as the logic of an economic system is concerned, a Asingle target@ for monetary policy consisting of an index of 
inflation and the exchange rate that is compatible with the economy=s structure, is logically viable, and the two 
extremes may be thought of as particular corner solutions to the problem of selecting such an index that are 
unlikely to be optimal in any usual sense. They are, however, simple and easily understood by the public at large, 
which as far as the politics of monetary policy is concerned, is a decisive advantage in any country where 
democratic accountability in such matters is taken seriously. 
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Canada, it is not written into its governing legislation.5 
Inflation targets have been in place since 1991, with only minor modifications, and, as Figure 1 shows, 
the Bank of Canada has had considerable success in attaining them, particularly in the second half of the >90s. 
Before then, there was a marked tendency for inflation to remain in the lower half of the target range, or even to 
fall below its lower bound. These targets now seem to be credible, and to enjoy widespread political support too, 
so much so that their renewal at the end of 2000 for a further five years was completely uncontroversial among 
the general public. 
The institutional background against which inflation targets are pursued is of course complex. Suffice it 
here to note: that the Bank of Canada Act gives that institution all the legal authority necessary to conduct of 
monetary policy as it is usually understood, and to provide lender of last resort facilities to the financial sector; 
that, like many other central banks nowadays, the Bank of Canada relies primarily on its control of the overnight 
interest rate to exert influence on the economy; that, unlike many central banks, it has no regulatory authority over 
the banking system beyond that inherent in its role in the clearing and settlement system, these powers resting 
mainly with the Superintendent of Financial Institutions and the Canadian and Quebec Deposit Insurance 
Corporations; and that the exchange rate of the Canadian dollar is market determined, in the everyday sense of the 
phrase, the Bank of Canada not having intervened in the foreign exchange market since August 1998. 
The Bank enjoys de facto Ainstrument independence@ in normal times, though the nature of its corporate 
structure as defined by the Bank of Canada Act does put certain limits on this. The Bank is a crown corporation, 
with all shares being held by the Minister of Finance on behalf of the people of Canada, and its twelve directors 
are part time political appointees. Though they exercise no control over the conduct of policy, they are not 
without indirect influence. Specifically, the directors appoint both the Governor and Senior Deputy Governor, 
subject to cabinet approval, and take seriously their responsibility for overseeing the competence with which the 
Bank=s professional staff undertakes its work. Furthermore, the Deputy Minister of Finance is a thirteenth, but 
non-voting, member of the Board, while the Governor is expected to consult regularly with the Minister himself 
regarding the conduct of policy. Even so, policy decisions are made by an informal Governing Council consisting 
of the Governor, the Senior Deputy Governor, and four other Deputy Governors, who are protected from day to 
day political pressures by two factors. 
First, the appointments of the Governor and his Senior Deputy are on a Agood behaviour@ basis and for 
seven year terms; hence they can only be removed by Act of Parliament, and the timing of appointments and 
reappointments is desynchronized from the electoral cycle. 
                                                 
5This still suggests, as it did in 1934, that the Bank should  A. . . regulate credit and currency in the best 
interests of the economic life of the nation, to protect the external value of the national monetary unit and to 
mitigate by its influence fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices and employment, so far as 
may be possible within the scope of monetary action, and generally to promote the economic and financial 
welfare of Canada.@  
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Second, and crucially, there is a unique local arrangement, known as dual responsibility, which came into 
being in the wake of the so-called Coyne affair, in which the Governor of the Bank, James Coyne was forced 
from office in 1961 by a government that disagreed with his policies. Under this arrangement, it is the Bank 
which is normally responsible for monetary policy, but, in the event of any disagreement, the Minister of Finance 
has final authority.  He must, however, exert it by issuing and publishing a written directive to the Governor, cast 
in specific terms and for a specific and limited time period. This much is written into the Bank of Canada Act as it 
was amended in 1967. Not in the Act, but equally important, is the clear understanding, first enunciated by 
Coyne=s successor Louis Rasminsky, as a condition of accepting the governorship, that such any directive will be 
read by the Governor as a request for his resignation, which will immediately be forthcoming.6  
None of this means that the Bank of Canada is inclined to insulate itself from public opinion. On the 
contrary, Aincreased transparency@ has been very much a watchword in recent years.7 The Bank issues an Annual 
Report two semi-annual Monetary Policy Reports, interspersed with two briefer up-dates, and now sets its 
interest-rate target every six weeks, releasing a short explanation of its action (or inaction) when it does so. The 
Governor and his officials also appear regularly before Parliamentary Committees and give frequent lectures and 
speeches to interested groups. Hence the Bank=s considerable degree of autonomy from day to day politics is 
accompanied, and indeed strengthened, by a continuous effort to explain its actions to the electorate. 
Nevertheless, and crucial to the topic of this essay, the Bank of Canada has no authority over the 
country=s choice of exchange rate arrangements. The Bank of Canada Act clearly states that it functions as the 
elected government=s agent in the foreign exchange market.  This means that, even within the current monetary 
order, foreign exchange market intervention can only be undertaken with the permission of the Minister of 
Finance. It also means that any decision to change the Canadian monetary order by fixing the exchange rate, 
creating a currency board, joining a currency union, or adopting the US dollar as Canada=s domestic currency, is 
clearly and solely the responsibility of that elected government. 
 
Canada=s Economic Performance since 1991 
Formal inflation targets were introduced in Canada in 1991, but a shift towards making low inflation the central 
goal of monetary policy antedated their adoption by about three years. A notable landmark here was Governor 
John Crow=s 1988 lecture on AThe Work of Monetary Policy@ in the wake of which there was much talk of a Azero 
inflation@ goal for monetary policy. This phrase appeared in no official pronouncements of which I am aware, 
and, in fact, Crow set neither precise targets nor a time horizon for achieving them in 1988.8  Nor was any 
                                                 
6A brief guide to this episode is to be found in Laidler and Robson (1993) pp. 38 et seq. 
7The lectures collected together in Thiessen (2001) are the key source documenting the evolution of Bank 
of Canada thinking about policy transparency in the 1990s. 
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8The phrase seems to have come into common use, following the publication of a (1990) collection of 
clarification of the Bank=s intentions soon forthcoming, beyond a number of reaffirmations that Aprice stability@ 
was its aim, and, from mid-1989 onwards, the implementation of a marked tightening of monetary policy. 
Even this imprecise goal did not at first seem to be shared by the elected government, as for example, 
David Johnson (1990) and William Robson (1990), who made use of inflation forecasts embodied in the Federal 
Budget of that year to make their point, were quick to note. This was, inevitably, a contentious matter in a country 
whose central bank legislation made it clear that ultimate responsibility for monetary policy did indeed rest with 
the elected government. The critical question in the ensuing debate quickly became - to borrow the title of my 
own contribution to it - How Shall We Govern the Governor?9  But, presumably because a Minister of Finance, 
who was then presiding over a large and rapidly growing public debt and a chronic current account deficit, would 
not have found it expedient to provoke the resignation of a central bank Governor by publicly ordering him to 
implement policies which would clearly have led to higher inflation, it was the Bank=s policies that prevailed over 
this period. 
It might seem that the announcement of inflation targets in 1991, jointly agreed between the government 
and the Bank, reflected a strategic change of attitude towards the conduct of macroeconomic policy in general, 
and monetary policy in particular, on the part of elected politicians, but this was not the case. Whatever the Bank 
of Canada=s longer term intentions might have been when inflation targets were put in place, from the point of 
view of the government of the day, they were introduced almost accidentally, and certainly opportunistically. 
1991 was the year in which Canada=s federal government replaced a hidden, and rather narrowly based, 
Manufacturer=s Sales Tax with a highly visible and altogether more broadly based value added tax, known locally 
as the Goods and Services Tax (GST), and this change was widely and correctly expected to impart a once-and-
for-all upward push to the measured CPI.  There was a perceived threat, based on statements by trade union 
leaders, that this once and for all push might set in motion an upward spiral of money wages and prices, 
particularly in unionised sectors of the economy, and the government seems to have regarded inflation targets as a 
useful tool in forestalling this threat. They enabled the point to be made clearly that monetary policy could be 
expected to accommodate the initial impact of the GST on the price level, but not any second and subsequent 
round effects. 
Not surprisingly, the mere announcement of inflation targets did not establish their credibility. It required 
                                                                                                                                                                         
essays, edited by Richard Lipsey, entitled Zero Inflation: the Goal of Price Stability but it is not clear that it was 
this title that originated the use of this phrase to characterise Bank of Canada policy.  
9This debate culminated in the publication of a parliamentary report on The Mandate and Governance of 
the Bank of Canada (Canada, Parliament, 1992) commonly known as the Manley Report which recommended no 
changes in these matters. This Report is discussed by Laidler and Robson (1993) pp.125 et seq. Nevertheless, the 
Bank=s own creation of an informal Governing Council, responsible for monetary policy decisions, and its 
increasing attention to issues of accountability and policy transparency during the 1990s should probably be seen 
as responses to this debate. 
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political developments, none of which looked very likely ex ante, to make real headway here. 
First, the election of a Liberal government at the end of 1993 had the widely expected consequence that 
John Crow, whose term as Governor was co-incidentally expiring, and whose conduct of policy had become an 
election issue, did not continue in office for a second term. He was replaced, however, not by one of his critics, 
but by the Bank=s Senior Deputy Governor, Gordon Thiessen who immediately struck an agreement about 
inflation targets with the new government that weakened them only cosmetically. Specifically the target range of 
1 - 3 per cent for inflation had, under Mr. Crow, been seen as a step along the way to Aprice stability@, defined as 
an inflation rate of clearly less than 2 per cent., which was to be attained in 1995. Under Mr. Thiessen the 
quantitative definition of Aprice stability@ was postponed pending further experience, and in fact the 1 - 3 per cent 
range has now become a permanent feature of the economic landscape.10  
In addition to supporting inflation targets, that same new Government, having abandoned its election 
pledges to abolish (or Areplace@) the GST and to seek major revisions to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, then proceeded to put in place, beginning with its 1995 budget, a fiscal regime that, three years later, 
brought to an end a quarter century of deficits and has produced surpluses ever since, even during the slow-down 
of 2001-02. The Amonetarist arithmetic@ that had hung over Canada=s inflation targets from their inception was 
thus transformed from a serious threat into a strong support that no-one who had followed the 1993 election 
campaign could reasonably have foreseen. 
Finally, it is worth reiterating that the Bank of Canada either achieved or undershot its assigned targets 
from the outset, and that the experience of low inflation from 1991 onwards must also have made its own 
contribution to the regime=s credibility. Figures 2 and 3 which present data on short and long term interest rates 
show how these fell in Canada in the mid-1990s, and also how long-standing US-Canadian interest differentials 
essentially disappeared at that time. 
Though Canada=s inflation targets have been in place for a decade, then, the creation of the broader policy 
framework necessary to establish their credibility and to create political support for them was an altogether slower 
process, and it would be wrong to think of the current monetary order having been firmly in place before about 
1995. This in turn makes the experience of the second half of the 1990s particularly relevant to assessing that 
order=s performance, and the accompanying charts should be read with this in mind. They show that, compared to 
the previous two decades, the period of inflation targeting in Canada has been one of immense improvement in 
economic performance: inflation has fallen and then remained low (Chart 1), as have nominal interest rates 
(Charts 2 and 3); real output growth has increased (Chart 4) and unemployment fallen (Chart 5), particularly 
towards the end of the decade, while the government debt to GDP ratio, particularly at the federal level, has fallen 
dramatically (Chart 6), as has the net foreign debt to GDP ratio.(Chart 7). 
                                                 




To be sure, no-one would want to attribute all of these results to the monetary order alone. The US-
Canada Free Trade Agreement, and its successor the NAFTA, played their part here, as did reforms of the 
Employment Insurance System. But a monetary order based on inflation targets and supported by budget 
surpluses has surely had much to do with setting and keeping in motion a virtuous economic policy circle in 
which monetary stability=s influence on interest rates has made fiscal stability easier to attain, which in turn has 
simplified the monetary authorities= task. The joint effect of these developments has been a benign 
macroeconomic policy background against which the ongoing microeconomic adjustments made necessary by the 
NAFTA have become easier to make. 
If ever there was a place and time when the Ait ain=t broken@ case could be made for Anot fixing@  a 
monetary order, it has surely been Canada in the last four or five years, and yet over this period, there has been a 
growing opinion among the business community, and among some academic economists too, that the time has 
come, or at least is fast approaching, to replace the current arrangement with a monetary order based in some way 
on the United States dollar. Two main arguments are advanced in favour of such a move. The first involves 
simplistic Ame-too@ reactions to the launch of the Euro as a virtual currency in 1999, and to the introduction of 
Euro notes and coins in 2002. The second,  more important by far, claims that the Canadian dollar=s significant 
depreciation against the U.S. dollar in the 1990s, and even since 1970s,  is symptomatic of some deeper economic 
malaise that can be cured by abandoning exchange rate flexibility in favour of some sort of fixed rate. 
More recently, this second argument has merged into a third, involving an altogether broader agenda for 
North American Economic integration. Though the events of September 11th, 2001, have given a new urgency to 
this newer argument, and changed its context too, the general question of further North American economic 
integration had already been placed firmly on the agenda before then, not least by the Bush administration=s new 
ambassador to Canada, Mr. Paul Cellucci, in an interview published by the National Post, a daily newspaper, on 
June 30, 2001. (Fife and Toulin, 2001)11 
 
                                                 
11It should be noted, however, that though Mr. Cellucci broached the issues of labour and goods market 
integration that might involve a harmonisation of external tariffs and immigration and refugee policies, as well as 
a common energy policy (which already seems to exist under the NAFTA), he did not explicitly mention the issue 
of monetary integration. 
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The Canadian Dollar=s Depreciation and The ALazy Manufacturer@ 
Chart 8 tells the story of the Canadian dollar=s exchange rate against the U.S. dollar over the last three decades. 
There has been a depreciation of a little over one third.  In the 1970s and early >80s, this could be attributed to a 
significant degree to Canada=s inflation rate being higher than that in the U.S., but for ten years now, this factor 
has, or ought to have been, working in the opposite direction. One important and under-stressed fact stands out in 
Chart 8, however: namely, that how big the depreciation of recent years might seem depends crucially upon the 
starting point one chooses as a basis for comparisons. Since 1990, it has been dramatic, but the exchange rate had 
already sunk a little below 70 cents for a short time in the >80s. Or, to put it another way, how serious a problem 
might be posed by the exchange rate=s current value depends on whether its trough in the mid 1980s, its peak in 
the early >90s, or perhaps both, are regarded as anomalous. 
Some critics of the current monetary order have suggested that the Canadian dollar=s depreciation since 
the early 1970s of a little over 30 per cent. can, in and of itself, be taken as  measuring the extent of the fall in 
local living standards relative to those prevailing in the United States that exchange rate flexibility has either 
created or permitted. Thus Courchene and Harris (1999b) remarked that the Canadian currency=s decline from 
US$1.04 in 1974 to US$0.63 in the late summer of 1968 Arepresent[ed] an enormous fall in Canadian living 
standards vis-a-vis the Americans@ while Cooper (2001), an exponent of the view that the dollarization of Canada 
is inevitable, has referred to the currency=s decline as Aa national pay cut@. This is, of course, a debating point, and 
a misleading one at that, but those who have resorted to it have also made other more substantial arguments about 
the influence of the exchange rate on living standards which require respectful attention. 
In particular, these critics stress the much discussed matter of labour productivity growth in the Canadian 
economy, and note that though this improved in the 1990s, particularly in manufacturing, the gain fell short of 
that attained in the United States.12 They then point out that the exchange rate moved from a value significantly 
above its purchasing power parity level of around 80 cents in 1990, to one significantly below it by the end of the 
decade, and argue that this decline has itself been an important cause of slow productivity growth in Canada. Two 
potentially complementary mechanisms are said underlie this causative relationship. The first of these has been 
termed the lazy manufacturer hypothesis, and suggests that the declining exchange rate has discouraged many 
firms, particularly exporters, from taking productivity enhancing measures of all sorts.13 
This idea, though widely believed, is hard to take seriously when it is subjected to analytic scrutiny, and 
                                                 
12A more general concern with the behaviour of the standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita, 
underlies the stress placed on labour productivity in Canadian debates. It is worth noting that business sector 
multi-factor productivity actually grew a little faster in Canada than in the US in the 1990s. See Pilat (2001). This 
section of the current paper draws heavily on Laidler and Aba (2002) 
13These arguments have been advanced by Grubel (1999) and Courchene and Harris (1999a) in particular. 
The phrase lazy manufacturer seems to have been introduced by John McCallum (1998), who, however, is 
skeptical of the argument. 
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even some critics of the current monetary order who have advanced it, notably Courchene and Harris (1999a) 
have been careful to term it a Aconjecture@. It has it that Canadian firms, particularly in manufacturing, when faced 
with increasing foreign competition from jurisdictions where productivity has been growing rapidly have relied 
on a declining exchange rate to protect them, rather than take productivity-enhancing measures of their own to 
meet that competition, as they would have been forced to do under a monetary order involving some sort of fixed 
exchange rate.  
At first sight, this argument seems similar to that which has high inflation created by monetary laxity 
undermining productivity growth, and perhaps it derives some superficial plausibility from this appearance. 
However, the arguments are in fact quite different  In the case of high and variable inflation, it is uncertainty 
about the structure of relative prices that is said to deter investment and distort its structure too, hence 
undermining real economic performance. But, according to the lazy manufacturer hypothesis as applied to Canada 
in the 1990s, the baleful effects of a declining exchange rate have appeared against a background of low and 
stable inflation, by way of a mechanism that relies not on uncertainty about a volatile exchange rate, but on the 
very predictability of exchange depreciation. 
From the standpoint of orthodox economic analysis, the main difficulty with the lazy manufacturer 
hypothesis is its incompatibility with profit-maximisation. If productivity enhancing steps had in fact been readily 
available to Canadian manufacturers in the 1990s, then the declining exchange rate which permitted their survival 
without taking such measures must also have provided significant profit opportunities that they failed to exploit.14 
Only if these firms are satisficers of some sort is this point not sufficient to refute the lazy manufacturer 
hypothesis. Though there are badly run firms everywhere, some of which may well behave Aas if@ satisficers, there 
seems to be no independent evidence that such behaviour is more prevalent in Canada than anywhere else. 
Even more compelling here, however, is a growing body of empirical evidence on the details of labour 
productivity growth in the US and Canadian economies. If the behaviour of some economy wide variable such as 
the exchange rate lay at the root of poor productivity performance in any economy, one would expect its influence 
to be by and large across the board, albeit perhaps a little concentrated in sectors directly involved in foreign 
trade. It is, however, well known by now that the spectacular productivity gains that have been made in the United 
States in the 1990s have been very narrowly concentrated in the electrical and machinery manufacturing sectors. 
Outside of these two sectors, the gains have been much more modest. Indeed they have sometimes fallen short of 
those made in the comparable sectors of the Canadian economy. The upshot is that Canada=s lagging labour 
productivity overall is more than accounted for by two facts: electrical and machinery manufacturing are a much 
smaller part of the Canadian economy than of the US, and Canadian firms in these sectors have performed 
                                                 
14The same point may be put in another way. Advocacy of low taxes and of exchange rate fixity often go 
together in Canadian policy debates, but if the prospect of realising lower output prices from foreign markets 
would have encouraged higher productivity growth in the 1990s, then it would have been  higher, not lower 
domestic taxes that would have worked in the same direction. 
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relatively less well than their US counterparts.15 Furthermore, if one looks for Canadian firms that have performed 
badly in a absolute sense in the 1990s, these are heavily concentrated among small manufacturers of all sorts, only 
about ten per cent of which are engaged in exporting.  These details of the data might give cause for concern, but 
it is hard to deploy them in support of the view that the nature of the Canadian monetary order in general, or its 
exchange rate component in particular, are responsible for the economy=s labour productivity performance. 
 
The Exchange Rate and the Price of Capital Goods 
Rapid productivity growth in the electrical machinery and manufacturing sectors in the United States in large 
measure reflects the rapid technical progress that has been made in information and communications equipment, 
and this equipment is, of course, an input into the production of other goods. Firms that have invested heavily in it 
in the 1990s should themselves have experienced extra productivity growth as a result.16  This point, and the fact 
that Canada is an important importer of such equipment from the US, requires, as Richard Harris (2002) has 
forcefully argued, that a second argument linking the exchange rate=s depreciation in the 1990s to the economy=s 
productivity performance be taken seriously, namely that rising prices of imported capital goods have discouraged 
investment, particularly in new technology. 
Note, however, that even if this argument is factually correct, which Lamarre (2002) has recently 
questioned, it is, as both he and Lafrance and Schembri (1999-2000) have stressed, an argument about the effects 
of a falling real exchange rate on relative input prices. In order to show that such effects as exist can be traced to 
the workings of Canada=s current monetary order, it must be established that the decline in the real exchange rate 
that undoubtedly took place in the 1990s can plausibly be attributed to the functioning of a flexible nominal 
exchange rate within that order. If instead, the real exchange rate=s behaviour has itself been the consequence of 
real factors, then under a fixed nominal exchange rate the same real depreciation would have had to take  place 
through other channels. And in that case, the relative price of imported capital goods faced by Canadian firms 
would still have risen, and would still have tended to discourage productivity enhancing investment. 
It is one of the curiosities of the literature on exchange rate regimes that purchasing power parity 
commands so much attention and respect, not just as a concept to be deployed when making international 
comparisons of living standards where it is indispensable, but as a theory of the long run behaviour of nominal 
exchange rates too. The frequency with which the word Amisalignment@ is used synonymously with Adeviation 
from purchasing power parity@ when the exchange rate is discussed in Canadian debates attests to the idea=s 
influence. And yet to use words in this way, and thus rely on purchasing power parity as a guide to the long run 
                                                 
15See Rao and Tang (2001), especially Table 2, for evidence on these matters. 
16Note that potentially important measurement issues arise at this point. To the extent that productivity 
growth in equipment producing industries is overstated by the widespread use of hedonic price indices to deflate 
nominal output, it will be understated in equipment using industries, and vice versa. 
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equilibrium level of the nominal exchange rate, is equivalent to advancing the hypothesis that, in the long run, the 
equilibrium Canada - US real exchange rate is a constant. The US, however, is an importer of primary 
commodities, and Canada is a major exporter. They accounted for just over 30 per cent of Canadian exports at the 
end of the 1990s, down from about 50 per cent thirty years earlier, though their share in Canadian GDP has 
remained essentially stable at a little over 10 per cent over that period. Given that world commodity prices are 
extremely variable, real exchange rate constancy between Canada and the US is highly unlikely, and indeed, what 
is locally referred to as the ABank of Canada Equation@ is consistent with the proposition that this is not the case.17 
The equation in question was first developed in the early 1990s (see Amano and van Norden 1993, 1995) 
and, unusually in the exchange rate literature, it is still performing well despite its extreme simplicity (see Laidler 
and Aba 2002 for a recent up-date). This equation makes the real exchange rate a lagged function of three 
variables: the real price of non-energy commodities, the real price of energy commodities, and the short-term US - 
Canada interest differential. The property that makes this equation Awork@ is its division of commodity prices into 
two components. Non-energy prices enter, and strongly, with the expected positive sign, but energy prices usually 
take a perverse sign, and sometimes, particularly when more recent data are used, are statistically insignificant 
too.18  
The Bank of Canada equation has proved to be rather robust, particularly as far as the role of non-energy 
commodity prices is concerned, even in the face of data generated since it was first developed. Chart 9 displays 
the outcome of the following standard exercise reported by Laidler and Aba (2002).  The equation in question was 
estimated over the period 1970-1995, with the coefficient on commodity prices being allowed to take a different 
value in each decade, to pick up the effects of what is believed to be the declining importance of commodities 
among Canada=s exports, and then used as the basis of a dynamic simulation to generate forecasts of the nominal 
exchange rate down to the end of last year.  This chart shows in particular that the equation picks up the exchange 
rate=s decline in the mid-1980s, and attributes its subsequent recovery to a combination of tight domestic 
                                                 
17 In his influential survey of these issues, Kenneth Rogoff (1996) did not mention terms of trade changes 
as a reason why exchange rates among advanced countries might deviate from purchasing power parity, even 
though they lie at the centre of many discussions of the behaviour of the exchange rates of less developed 
commodity producing countries. In more recent work, however, (Chen and Rogoff 2002), he has investigated 
commodity price effects on the exchange rates of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. They are present in all 
three cases, but seem more fragile for Canada than for the other two countries. 
18Why energy prices enter the equation in this way is a matter of ongoing debate. One explanation, 
favoured by Bank of Canada researchers, is that Canadian manufacturing exports are particularly energy 
intensive, and that the depressing effect of rising energy prices on their international competitiveness more than 
offsets the direct effect on the real exchange rate of the prices of energy exports themselves. Another, due to John 
Helliwell (2000), suggests that the result is an econometric artifact stemming from the fact that large swings in 
energy prices are often associated with international political developments that trigger a flight to quality effect 
on the US dollar=s international value. Hence rising energy prices have been correlated with US dollar 
appreciations because both have had a common cause, and not because one has brought the other about.  
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monetary policy in Canada, and a world-wide commodity price boom. It also suggests that the decline in the 
exchange rate in the latter half of the 1990s, which helped to start the current debate about Canada=s monetary 
order, was the predictable consequence of the behaviour of commodity prices and interest rates over that period. 
More generally, but crucially as far as the debate about the sources of poor productivity performance are 
concerned, there is no evidence that the decline in the real exchange rate during the 1990s, which undoubtedly has 
made imported capital goods more expensive and may therefore have contributed to the relatively slow growth of 
labour productivity in Canada over that period, can be attributed to the monetary order.19 Rather it seems to have 
been the consequence of deeper seated real forces that have made a large fraction of Canadian exports less 
valuable than they previously were. If this is so, then under any monetary order based on a fixed nominal 
exchange rate, the burden of adjustment would have fallen on domestic prices and money wages. Indeed, Robson 
and Laidler (2002) estimate that, had a fixed nominal exchange rate been in place, an average rate of deflation (as 
measured by the GDP delflator) of between 1 and 2 per cent per annum would have been required in the second 
half of the 1990s to bring about the fall in Canada=s real exchange rate required by declining commodity prices. 
There is, then, a strong burden of proof upon those who argue that some sort of fixed exchange rate would 
have served Canada well in recent years to explain either why they believe that such a deflation would have been 
unnecessary, or how it could have been accomplished without a recession that would have tended to reduce, not 
increase, the rate of productivity enhancing investment relative to that which has actually been achieved.20 
 
Proposals for a Common North American Currency 
Even though there is no evidence that Canada=s post-1991 monetary order has contributed to a poor real economic 
performance on any front, proposals for replacing it began to attract attention in 1998.  No serious commentator 
has advocated the simple adoption of an adjustably pegged exchange rate of the traditional type as an end in itself, 
though Harris (2001) suggested that an exchange rate regime resembling the 1990s European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism might be a useful first step towards fuller North American monetary integration, while Courchene and 
Harris (1999a) argued that a fixed rate regime, whose details they did not spell out, could play the same role prior 
to the establishment of a fully fledged North American Monetary Union (NAMU) based on a new common 
currency. However, other opponents of the current order, notably Herbert Grubel (1999), have agreed from the 
outset with its defenders that the problems of establishing credibility for a pegged exchange rate, whose value 
could be set, and therefore changed, by a simple administrative decision taken by the Minister of Finance, would 
                                                 
19The reader is nevertheless reminded of Lamarre=s (2002) skepticism on this question. He argues that the 
decline in Canadian investment relative to the US in the 1990s is as easily interpreted as a return to matters as 
they were for most of the 1980s, as a response to the fall in the real exchange rate. 
20Buiter (1999), taking an outsider=s view of the North American debate, seems to me to underplay the 
importance of this economic argument. 
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make such a half-way house inferior to either extreme. 
A legislatively fixed value for the exchange rate is the next step along the continuum that lies between a 
pegged rate and a common currency. The recent collapse of Argentina=s version of such an arrangement (usually, 
though misleadingly referred to as a currency board) has been widely noted in Canada, however.21 That is why a 
common North American currency is increasingly seen as the alternative of choice to current arrangements. 
Indeed just such an arrangement was proposed by Grubel in the (1999) pamphlet that set the current Canadian 
debate in motion.  
Grubel, however, working from the European blueprint, envisaged a new North American currency - the 
Amero - with monetary policy overseen by a new supra-national central bank. This proposal suffers from the fatal 
defect, more obvious with hindsight than initially, that neither the United States authorities nor the United States 
electorate has shown the slightest interest in it. In the late 1990s, when Grubel prepared his proposal, he was able 
to argue that, in the then immediate future, currency competition from the soon-to-be-launched Euro might 
sufficiently threaten the international role of the dollar that the creation of a new North American currency could 
become attractive, both economically and politically, to the US. At the current juncture, and whatever might 
happen in the longer term, this possibility does not seem to be on any near- or even medium-term horizon. Thus, it 
is now understood that, if Canada is to adopt a monetary order based on a common North American currency, that 
currency is going to be the United States dollar, and it is this form of monetary integration that I shall henceforth 
discuss. 
Some commentators, for example Cooper (2001), have suggested that market forces alone will lead to the 
voluntary adoption of the US dollar as Canada=s domestic currency. However, such hard evidence as exists on 
these matters suggests that any tendencies in this direction are hard to discern. Robson and Laidler (2002) show 
that Canadian residents= holdings of US dollar denominated accounts in domestic banks rose in the 1990s to about 
9 per cent. of M3, but also that this rise simply restored them to levels that had already been seen in the 1970s. As 
for the use of the US dollar as a unit of account for transactions between agents resident in Canada, preliminary 
work by the Bank of Canada (Murray and Powell 2002) suggests that, though not unknown, the practice is 
relatively rare. And this is to say nothing of the well established result that the network externalities inherent in 
monetary exchange present a barrier to the market driven replacement of one currency by another that is 
sufficiently strong to resist all pressures except those associated with extremely high and variable domestic 
inflation, a phenomenon that is completely absent from Canada. 
 
                                                 
21Argentina should be used with care as an example in the Canadian debate. An important factor in 
making its problems particularly acute was the that its exchange rate was fixed to the US dollar,  a currency that 
was important for its foreign borrowing, but relatively unimportant for its trade, which is mainly with other Latin 
American countries and Europe. These features have no parallel in the case of Canada, for which the United 
States is, essentially, the Arest of the world@ for both the capital and trade accounts. 
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The Economics of Adopting the US Dollar 
If Canada is to adopt the US dollar, then, that will have to be the outcome of a deliberate policy choice, and the 
strongest argument in favour of such a choice is the reduction in transactions costs that such a move would bring 
about. Foreign exchange conversion costs in cross border trade would vanish, as would those associated with 
hedging against exchange rate risks. With only two currencies involved, or three if Mexico makes a similar 
choice, the gains here would be smaller than those realised in Europe where eleven currencies were replaced by 
the Euro, but they would not be negligible. Robson and Laidler suggest that, for Canada, transactions cost savings 
alone might amount to as much as 0.26 per cent. of GDP.  Such cost reductions would presumably lead to an 
increase in trade, and hence to further gains to economic welfare. 
One study (Frankel and Rose 2000), widely cited in the Canadian media, has suggested that a gain of as 
much as 37 per cent in Canadian GDP might be created over a decade by the adoption of a common North 
American currency. Now Frankel and Rose=s results are contentious. They are based on data for groupings of 
economies, many of which, (eg. the East Caribbean currency union, The Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the 
UK) bear scant resemblance to a potential North American currency zone, and are affected by data generated 
before and after the break-up of currency unions between European powers and African colonies when far more 
than monetary arrangements changed. Furthermore, they have been shown to be econometrically fragile by Pakko 
and Wall (2001), while Thom and Walsh=s recent (2002) time series study of the Irish economy finds essentially 
no effect on its real performance from the end of its common currency arrangement with the UK, and also notes 
that the beginning of later and still continuing AIrish miracle@ predated the establishment of the Euro. 
Even if we ignore all this, which we probably should not, it is as well to note that Frankel and Rose=s 
estimate of the likely gains to Canada from adopting a common North American currency has two components to 
it: first the influence of a common currency on the volume of trade, and second the influence of increased trade on 
GDP. Relevant to the first effect are recent estimates by John Helliwell (1998) that, relative to the forecasts of a 
standard Agravity model@, the Aborder effect@ on Canadian - US trade is to reduce its volume about fourteen-fold,  
so Frankel and Rose=s suggestion that the adoption of a common currency might increase trans-border trade about 
four-fold does not seem to be a priori unreasonable. After all, the relatively small tariff reductions brought about 
by the FTA and NAFTA seem to have reduced the Aborder effect@ to Helliwell=s estimate of fourteen from John 
McCallum=s (1995) original estimate of over twenty.  However, the second step in the Frankel-Rose conclusions 
about the income generating potential of a common currency, namely their claims about the influence of trade 
creation on real output, gives more grounds for skepticism. 
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Recent work by Elton Fairfield (2001) throws light on this issue in a specifically North American context. 
 Fairfield points to the well known fact, long ago noted by Robert Mundell (1961) in his pioneering paper on 
optimal currency areas, that the goods produced on the two sides of the US.-Canadian border at any particular 
longitude are rather close substitutes for each other. Thus the pattern of comparative advantage in North America 
implies that the major gains are to be made, not from north-south, but from east-west trade. That being the case, 
the existence of quite small artificially imposed barriers to north-south trade can have a large negative effect on its 
volume, and their removal can lead to large increases. This hypothesis, for which Fairfield presents empirical 
support based on calibration exercises, both explains why border effects in North America are large, and why 
relatively small changes in cross-border transactions costs, such as the NAFTA brought about, can also have a 
large effect on their magnitude; and it also suggests that the transactions cost reductions associated with the 
adoption of a common currency could have similarly large effects on trade volumes. 
However, this hypothesis has an important corollary which Fairfield does not explore: namely, that the 
output, not to mention the welfare, losses and gains implicit in border effects and changes in transactions costs are 
small in the US.- Canada case. If this is so, then Frankel and Rose=s own skepticism about their estimates of the 
gains to Canadian output that might be realised by adopting the US dollar, estimates which are, after all, 
extrapolated from results obtained using data from other times and places, is well justified. All in all, it is hard to 
resist the Helliwell=s suggestion that the best thing to do about this whole contentious question is await the 
outcome of the natural experiment now taking place in Europe, where a common currency has been adopted by 
the Euro12 countries as a major element in a concerted drive to create a single market in goods services and 
capital, but not by three others also involved in that drive, namely Denmark, Sweden and the UK. 
Any gains from lower transactions costs associated with monetary integration would in any event come 
with a price in the Canadian case. To begin with, if Canada=s real exchange rate fluctuations are driven by market 
fundamentals that monetary integration would not change, then   under a common currency arrangement of any 
sort, Canada would not simply import US price level behaviour, as is widely believed. This would only be the 
outcome were the US.- Canada real exchange rate to remain constant over time, but, as we have seen, this has 
clearly not been the case in the past. The current monetary order enables Canada to maintain stable inflation while 
absorbing real exchange rate changes by movements in the nominal exchange rate, and this ability would be lost 
under a common currency. Given that Federal Reserve policy continues in future as it has in the recent past, to 
deliver low and stable domestic inflation for the US,  then either domestic inflation in Canada would become 
more variable than it now, or Canadian output and employment would fluctuate more, or both. 
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How serious a problem this would pose depends on whether monetary integration is envisaged as a 
measure in its own right, or as part of a broader package that also involves goods, and particularly labour, market 
integration. At present, fluctuations in the demand for labour, particularly in commodity production, that are 
associated with swings in world commodity prices, are usefully buffered to some extent by nominal exchange rate 
changes. With the latter mechanism eliminated under a common currency, all of the pressures involved here 
would be brought to bear on domestic money wages and prices, and given Canada=s rather (by North American 
standards) rigid labour market, this would involve potentially serious fluctuations in employment. Absent a 
common North American labour market, these would have to be accommodated within Canada, but they would 
present much less of a problem were it possible for workers displaced from the Canadian commodity sector to 
seek work anywhere in North America. Linguistic and cultural barriers to international labour mobility would 
almost certainly prove to be much smaller there than they are in the Euro zone. Even so, future European 
experience in responding to asymmetric shocks under a common currency will provide useful evidence on the 
relevance of this matter to the North American case. 
These points are well understood in Canada, but much less attention has been paid to another set of 
important issues to which Robson (2001) and Robson and Laidler (2002) have recently drawn attention. They 
point out that there can be a good deal more to monetary integration than the adoption of a common currency, 
depending on the form it takes. Simple unilateral dollarization of the Canadian economy along Panamanian or 
Ecuadoran lines would leave Canadian regulatory and clearing systems as they currently are. To the extent that 
the harmonization of such arrangements with their US. counterparts would be required to achieve full integration 
of the North American monetary system, then gains from unilateral dollarization might turn out to be 
disappointingly low. Indeed there might be losses, because unilateral dollarization would deprive the Canadian 
monetary authorities of the ability to create new liquidity at will for the financial system should circumstances 
require it. 
The importance of this last factor was brought home dramatically by the events of September 11, when 
the Canadian clearing system was saved from breakdown only by an immediate and large injection of high 
powered money by the Bank of Canada. Furthermore, it should be noted that the final breakdown of the 
Argentinian monetary system was precipitated by a banking crisis which might have been prevented had that 
country=s central bank been able to provide unlimited lender-of-last-resort facilities when the system first began to 
encounter liquidity problems. To be sure, under unilateral dollarization, the Bank of Canada, or indeed the large 
chartered banks, could hold stocks of US dollars, or arrange US dollar lines of credit, so the Canadian system 
would not be entirely devoid of access to liquidity in times of crisis, but these expedients would be costly, and 
could never provide quite the degree of security to the Canadian financial system that is currently available from a 
central bank that can create domestic money in unlimited amounts. 
These considerations strongly suggest that unilateral dollarization would raise costs of doing business for 
Canadian-based financial institutions, and expose them to greater risks too, thus increasing the costs of anyone 
utilising their services. It is not hard to imagine that, in such circumstances, many of these institutions would 
migrate to the United States to avail themselves of the central banking services available from the Federal Reserve 
System, leaving domestic customers to be serviced by Canadian branches or subsidiaries. Such adverse effects on 
Canada=s financial services sector are presumably not among the results that advocates of North American 
monetary integration have envisaged. 
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The technical solution to these problems is simple enough. Instead of undertaking unilateral dollarization, 
Canada might instead try to negotiate a fuller integration of its monetary system with that of the United States. It 
is sometimes suggested, for example, that full monetary integration might be achieved by having the Canadian 
chartered banks become members of the Federal Reserve system, a step which would ensure them access to the 
central banking and lender of last resort services provided by the Fed, as well as (perhaps along with other 
relevant financial institutions) access to US clearing systems. In addition to giving Canadian institutions access to 
the same lender-of-last-resort facilities as their American counterparts, such negotiated monetary integration 
would also bring them under the same regulatory framework, and hence enable them to compete on an equal 
footing in the North American market. The economic drawbacks associated with unilateral dollarization would 
thus be overcome. It is usually taken for granted by those who advocate such a move that it would also involve 
reconstituting the Bank of Canada as a new district bank of the Federal Reserve system, a measure that would also 
have the advantage of providing a Canadian voice at the table where monetary policy would be made for North 
America. 
 
The Politics of Adopting the US Dollar  
But, and it is a very large but indeed, this solution, so simple from an economic point of view, raises 
extraordinarily difficult political issues. As was noted earlier, the Bank of Canada is a crown corporation, but 
district banks of the Federal Reserve system are privately owned by those commercial banks operating in their 
districts which are also members of the System. Furthermore, unlike the Bank of Canada as currently constituted, 
Federal Reserve district banks have supervisory and regulatory authority over the member banks that own them, 
including the power to approve mergers among them, an authority which, in Canada resides with the Competition 
Bureau and Minister of Finance. To be sure, shares in district banks are not marketable, while the powers of their 
holders to influence district bank decisions, let alone, system decisions, are severely limited, and these 
arrangements work well enough in the United States, where there are literally thousands of small banks. But the 
Canadian banking system is dominated by six large institutions, and the rules which work well in limiting 
member banks= powers in the US might not be up to the job in Canada. 
In any event, is hard to imagine the Canadian electorate supporting the sale of the Bank of Canada to the 
chartered banks, which would then be regulated by it, and it is equally hard to imagine the US electorate, with its 
long-standing suspicions of concentration in banking, welcoming the addition of a large district dominated by six 
banks into their own Federal Reserve system. But if the unilateral adoption of the US dollar would have 
unattractive economic consequences for Canada, and if the measures needed to ensure the complete integration of 
the Canadian system into the Federal Reserve system are unlikely to attract political support in either Canada or 
the United States, then advocates of Canada=s adopting the US dollar need to do some hard thinking about just 
what form of North American monetary integration would both meet Canada=s economic needs, and attract 
political support both in Canada, but crucially in the United States too. 
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Any form of monetary integration that could conceivably meet Canada=s economic needs would have to 
provide Canadian banks with access to central banking services of the same quality as are available to their US 
competitors, and subject them to a regulatory and supervisory regime that did not put them at a competitive 
disadvantage. To achieve these ends, the active co-operation, not just of the US monetary authorities, but of the 
US Congress and executive as well would be required, and it is not clear how much of the needed co-operation 
would be forthcoming. It is worth recalling, for example, that, in 1999, Argentina=s attempts to negotiate a form of 
dollarization were gently but firmly rebuffed by the United States. As Lawrence Summers (1999), at that time 
under-secretary at the US treasury, remarked: 
 A. . . it would not, in our judgement, be appropriate for the United States authorities to extend the net of 
bank supervision, to provide access to the Federal Reserve discount window, or to adjust bank 
supervisory responsibilities or the procedures or orientation of US monetary policy in the light of another 
country deciding to adopt the dollar.” 
Now there is a degree of political support in the United States for dollarization in Latin America, to the 
extent of a willingness in some quarters to concede seigniorage revenue to dollarizing countries, (See US Senate 
1999) and Canada is surely of greater economic and political importance to the United States than Panama, 
Ecuador, El Salvador or Guatemala, the countries in Latin America that are currently dollarized.  However, it 
should be noted that, in the newspaper interview referred to earlier, and in a number of subsequent statements,  
Ambassador Cellucci has always been careful to state that, in seeking greater North American economic 
integration, the United States envisages no movement towards the kind of supra-national political arrangements 
that have emerged in Europe. Such statements have been read among Canadian supporters of North American 
economic integration as implying that the United States understands and respects Canada=s concerns about its 
national sovereignty. 
This, however, is surely a partial reading of the Ambassador=s meaning. His remarks also seem to imply 
that the United States has no intention of ceding any of its own national sovereignty to any other country or 
organisation.  In the context of proposals for monetary integration, which, surely significantly, the Ambassador 
has not explicitly discussed, such a stance suggests that, the coming to power of a new Administration 
notwithstanding, US policy has not changed since Secretary Summers made his statement in 1999. If this is so, 
then no form of North American monetary integration that would see Canada exerting political or administrative 
influence over the United States monetary order is politically acceptable there. 
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It seems likely, then, that any form of North American monetary integration that might interest the United 
States would involve monetary policy being made in Washington for the whole of North America by a Federal 
Reserve Board appointed by the President of the United States, and accountable to the American electorate 
through the Congress. The Canadian electorate would have no mechanisms available to it to hold those policy 
makers accountable for the effects of their actions on Canada, therefore. As to the supervision and regulation of 
Canada=s financial system under monetary integration, it is hard to believe that the United States authorities would 
be willing to negotiate the provision of central banking services to a set of institutions that remained subject to a 
separate and distinct regulatory regime. Note that Secretary Summers explicitly linked these matters in his 
statement. Either, then, Canada would retain a separate system with the disadvantages already described, or these 
functions too would be exercised according to rules laid down in the US, with no recourse for the Canadian 
electorate through political channels, should they be adversely affected, or think themselves to be adversely 
affected by their application. 
The transparency of monetary policy, and the political accountability of those who make it (not to 
mention of supervisors and  regulators too)  is a feature of Canada=s current monetary order upon which much 
energy has been, and continues to be, expended. It is hard to believe that the electorate would find their surrender 
acceptable.22  It will, therefore, be difficult indeed, perhaps impossible, to find a form of North American 
monetary integration that would be simultaneously economically efficient in Canada and politically acceptable on 
both sides of the US-Canadian border. 
 
Summary and Policy Implications 
Some of the arguments presented above, and some of the conclusions drawn are surely uncontroversial. The 
monetary choices that currently face Canada lie not between exchange rate regimes per se but between competing 
monetary orders, and both of the alternatives currently being considered are viable from the technical economic 
point of view. Inflation targeting, supported by conservative fiscal policies, has delivered low and credible 
inflation, and the economy=s real performance in the last few years has been excellent by the standards of the 
preceding three decades. On the other hand, some form of monetary integration with the United States, whether it 
were to take the form of unilateral dollarization or a negotiated absorption of the Canadian monetary system into 
that of the US also look feasible from a technical economic standpoint. There are obvious advantages in the way 
of reduced transactions costs to be had from such a monetary order, furthermore, if it takes the second form. 
North American monetary integration might nevertheless have some economic drawbacks. To stress the 
importance of terms-of-trade changes as influences on Canada=s real exchange rate leads directly to the view that 
a flexible nominal exchange rate is extremely useful in helping to reduce the shocks that these would otherwise 
impart to domestic money wages and prices. These are strong arguments, well grounded in theory and empirical 
evidence, but two points nevertheless must be noted. First, it may be that, under monetary integration, Canadian 
institutions would adapt so that nominal wages and prices would become more flexible; and second, were 
monetary integration to be accompanied by measures to enhance goods and labour market integration, then the 
resource re-allocations that occur in response to real shocks would have their consequences spread across a much 
bigger market than at present, and the case for easing them by way of nominal exchange rate adjustments would 
be weakened.23  On the economics of the matter, then, it is possible for reasonable people to disagree about where 
                                                 
22Mundell (2001) gives an extensive and extremely interesting historical survey of the various forms that 
monetary integration among sovereign states may take and has taken. He is careful to note that in some 
circumstances it may involve one or more countries ceding sovereignty to another, which then becomes a 
monetary hegemon, but he does not discuss the extent to which such arrangements impinge upon the liberal 
political principle that policy makers should be accountable to those on whose behalf they operate. 
23The reader is reminded yet again that evidence on these matters will in due course be provided by the 
natural experiment currently under way in Europe. 
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the balance of advantage actually lies here between the status quo and monetary integration of some sort. 
The critical issues at stake are not economic but political, and they are often stated in terms of national 
sovereignty. Now national sovereignty is eroding on many fronts across the world, and Canadian commentators 
often point to developments in Europe as an example to be emulated in North America. However, European 
nations have ceded sovereignty to EU-wide institutions  - the Council, Commission, Court, Parliament, and in 
monetary matters to a Central Bank, - and, though there are complaints about a Ademocratic deficit@ at the 
European level of government, citizens of all European nations are in the same position vis-a-vis its institutions.  
Given current American attitudes, however, which from an American standpoint are surely quite reasonable, it is 
hard to envisage the United States ceding any control in matters of monetary policy or financial regulation and 
oversight to any officials who are not fully and solely accountable to the domestic electorate. 
The only form of North American monetary integration that is politically feasible, therefore, would 
involve Canada in ceding sovereignty over monetary matters, not to some supra-national institution which would 
wield its authority on behalf of all members of a North American Monetary Union, and be accountable to 
members of the Canadian electorate among others, but to authorities answerable only to the elected government of 
a neighbouring nation. Such a step would involve not just a surrender of Canadian national sovereignty, but much 
more importantly, a significant attenuation of the authority and accountability of representative government as it 
would affect Canadian citizens. It is in this latter effect that constitutes the really unpalatable political 
consequence of North American monetary integration relative to the maintenance of the current monetary order, 
and it deserves more attention than it is currently getting either in the context of the Canadian policy debate, or, 
more generally, in the academic literature on monetary unions. 
Finally, it is worth recalling that Canada=s current monetary order is coherent and is functioning well, and 
that it is hard to find serious evidence in support of the claims made by its opponents that its workings have had 
seriously adverse effects on the economy. In the light of these considerations, and in the light of the grave 
political problems implicit in North American monetary integration, it is hard to make case for Canada=s doing 






Amano, R. and van Norden, S. (1993) A forecasting equation for the Canada-US dollar exchange rate, in The 
Exchange Rate and the Economy, Ottawa, Bank of Canada 
------------ (1995) Terms of trade and real exchange rates: the Canadian evidence, Journal of International Money 
and Finance 14, (April) 83 - 104  
Buiter, W. (1999) The EMU and the NAMU: what is the case for North-American monetary union? Canadian 
Public Policy 25 (Sept.) 285-305 
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Sub-committee on the Bank of Canada 
(The Manley Committee) (1992) The Mandate and Governance of the Bank of Canada Ottawa 
Chen, Y-C. And Rogoff, K. (2002) Commodity currrencies and empirical exchange rate puzzles, IMF Working 
Paper WP/02/27, Washington DC.: IMF 
Courchene, T. J. and Harris, R. G. (1999a)  From Fixing to Monetary Union: Options for North American 
Currency Integration, Toronto, C. D. Howe Institute 
------------ (1999b) Canada and a North American monetary union Canadian Business Economics (Dec.) 5-12 
Cooper, S. (2001) Time for US loonie  National Post November 9 
Fairfield, J. E. (2001) Canada-US Border Effects - An Explanation, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Dept. of 
Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Canada 
Fife, R. and Toulin, A. (2001) U.S. aims to dismantle borders National Post June 30, A1 & A6  
Fischer, S. (1995) Central bank independence revisited American Economic Review 85 (Papers and Proceedings) 
201-206 
Frankel, J. and Rose, A (2000) An estimate of the effect of currency unions on trade and growth, NBER Working 
Paper 7857 
Furstenberg, G. von (2000) A case against US dollarization Challenge 43 (July-Aug.) 108-120 
Grubel, H. G. (1999) The Case for the Amero: the Economics and Politics of a North American Monetary Union, 
Vancouver, the Fraser Institute  
Harris, R. G. (2000) From fixing to NAMU: redressing Canada=s sinking float, paper presented at a Bank of 
Canada conference on The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates Revisited Ottawa, Bank of Canada 
------------ (2001) Symbol of Weakness, Financial Post Nov. 1st, FP15 
Helliwell, J. (1998) How Much do National Borders Matter? Washington D. C., The Brookings Institution  
------------ (2000) Assessing the evidence about the effects of exchange rate systems, contribution to a panel 
discussion at conference on The Case for Flexible Exchange Rate Revisited, Ottawa, Bank of Canada 
Heymann, D. and Leijonhufvud, A. (1995) High Inflation London, Oxford University Press 
 
 23
Johnson, D. R. (1990) The zero inflation target: do Wilson and John Crow agree? Canadian Public Policy 14 
(Sept) 
Jonung, L. (2002) National or international inflation targeting: the Wicksellian dilemma of the Euro-outs (Sweden 
and the UK) in the EU Paper prepared for the Robert Schuman Centre workshop on Currency 
Independence in an Interdependent World, Brussels, European Commission, mimeo 
Lafrance, R. And Schembri, L. l. (1999-2000) The exchange rate, productivity and the standard of living Bank of 
Canada Review (Winter) 17-28 
Laidler, D. (1991) How Shall We Govern the Governor? A Critique of the Governance of the Bank of Canada 
Toronto, C. D. Howe Institute 
------------ (1999) The exchange rate and Canada=s monetary order Working Paper 99-7 Ottawa, Bank of Canada. 
------------ and Aba, S. (2002) Low Productivity Growth: The Exchange Rate Connection and Commodities 
Commentary Toronto, C. D. Howe Institute 
------------ and Robson, W. B. P (1993) The Great Canadian Disinflation Toronto, C. D. Howe Institute 
Lamarre, J-F., (2002) The Effect of the Real Exchange Rate on Canadian Productivity, unpublished M.A. thesis, 
Dept of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, P.Q. 
Lipsey, R.G. (ed.) (1990) Zero Inflation: The Goal of Price Stability Toronto, C. D. Howe Institute 
McCallum, J. (1995) National borders matter: Canada-US regional trade patterns American Economic Review 85 
(June) 615-623 
------------ (1998) Drivers of the Canadian dollar and policy implications Current Analysis, Toronto, Royal Bank 
of Canada 
Mundell, R. (1961) A theory of optimum currency areas American Economic Review 51 (Sept.) 717-725 
------------ (2001) Money and the sovereignty of the state in A. Leijonhufvud (ed.) Monetary Theory and Policy 
Experience Houndmills, Palgrave, in association with the International Economic Association 
Murray, J. and Powell, J. (2002) Dollarization in Canada (the buck stops there) Ottawa, Bank of Canada, mimeo. 
Orr, D. (1999) The Canadian Dollar: Why Do Such Bad Things Happen in Such a Good Economy, Ottawa, 
WEFA 
Pakko, M. R. and Wall, H. J. (2001) Reconsidering the trade-creating effects of a currency union FRB of St. Louis 
Review 83 (Sept.- Oct) 37-46 
Pilat, D. (2001) Productivity growth in the OECD area: some recent findings International Productivity Monitor 
#3 (Fall) 3-18 
Rao, S. and Tang, J. (2001) The contribution of ICTs to productivity growth in Canada and the United States in 
the 1990s, International Productivity Monitor (Fall) 3 - 18 
 
 24
Robson, W. B. P (1990) Not so fine tuning: Bank of canada policy and inflation since 1986 Commentary, 
Toronto, C. D. Howe Institute, (Aug.) 
------------ (2001) New currency regimes: how green the grass? how high the fence? Policy Options 22 (May) 45-
50 
------------ and Laidler, D. (2002) No small change: the awkward economics and politics of North American 
monetary integration, Commentary No. 167, Toronto, C. D. Howe Institute 
Rogoff, K. (1996) The purchasing power parity puzzle Jopurnal of Economic Literature 34 (June) 647-668 
Summers, L. (1999) Overcoming volatility: Latin America and the IDB, remarks by Lawrence H. Summers, 
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Inter-American Development Bank Annual Meetings, Paris, France , 
March 15. Treasury News, Washington D.C.  US. Treasury 
Thiessen, G. (2001) The Thiessen Lectures: Lectures delivered by Gordon G. Thiessen, Governor of the Bank of 
Canada 1994-2001 Ottawa, Bank of Canada 
Thom, R. and Walsh, B. (2002) The effects of a currency union on trade: lessons from the Irish experience, 
Dublin, University College, mimeo 
US Senate, Joint Economic Committee (1999) Encouraging Official Dollarization in emerging Markets, Staff 
Report, Washington D. C., Office 0f the Chairman, Senator Connie Mack 
 
 25













Chart 2: 90 - Day Prime Corporate Paper Rate (Canada) and 3 - Month Commercial Paper Rate 
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Chart 3: Government Bond Yield 5 -10 Year (Canada) and Government Bond Yiel 10 Year 
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Chart 6: Federal, Provincial and Local Canadian NetDebt/GDP Ratios; Source: CANSIM Series 
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